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Resumen
Hoy en día se escucha decir con frecuencia que los sistemas 
jurídicos basados en el derecho romano, o derecho civil, y el 
llamado «common law» están convergiendo—incluso en cuanto 
se refiere a las normas procesales. Aunque los estudiosos del 
tema tienden a afirmar que dicha convergencia es producto de la 
reciente globalización, un examen de la historia del procedimiento 
de “equity” en los Estados Unidos sugiere que la convergencia 
procesal no es nueva en absoluto. Los tribunales de “chancery” del 
siglo XIX en los EE.UU. aplicaban una modalidad de procedimiento 
que facultaba a los funcionarios judiciales frente a los abogados y 
litigantes y que se basaba en un enfoque escrito, orientado hacia 
la confidencialidad, para recibir el testimonio de un testigo. En 
este sentido, el procedimiento de “equity” de los EE.UU. acogió 
aspectos clave del modelo de procedimiento inquisitorio asociado 
de tiempo atrás con la tradición del derecho civil basada en los 
cánones romanos y considerado un anatema en el “common law”. 
Esta historia sugiere que la convergencia es mucho más antigua 
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de lo que generalmente suponemos, y de contera, también sirve 
como valioso recordatorio de los límites de nuestras categorías 
comparativas estándar de análisis.
Palabras Clave
Historia Jurídica de los Estados Unidos - Historia Jurídica Inglesa 
- Procedimiento de Equity- Derecho y Procedimiento Comparado – 
Convergencia - Tribunales de Chancery – Inquisitorio – Acusatorio 
- Common Law - Derecho Civil.
Abstract
We commonly hear today that civil law and common law legal 
systems are converging—including as concerns the law of 
procedure.  Although scholars tend to claim that such convergence 
is a product of recent globalization, an examination of the history 
of equity procedure in the United States suggests that procedural 
convergence is in no way new.  Nineteenth-century U.S. chancery 
courts applied a mode of procedure that empowered court officials 
vis-à-vis lawyers and litigants and that relied on a written, secrecy-
oriented approach to taking witness testimony. In these respects, 
U.S. equity procedure embraced key aspects of the inquisitorial 
model of procedure long associated with the Roman-canon-based 
civil law tradition and thought to be anathema to the common 
law. This history suggests that convergence is much older than 
we generally assume, and in so doing, also serves as a valuable 
reminder of the limits of our standard comparative categories of 
analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Among scholars of civil procedure today, there is a great deal of 
talk about convergence. The notion that the procedural systems 
of the world are firmly divided between those of common 
law and civil law origin has given way to a new emphasis on 
commonality.  Various common law and civil law procedural 
systems, we are told, are each beginning to embrace features 
long associated with their presumably alien counterparts. 
Among the most prominent of recent examples regularly cited 
as evidence of such convergence is England’s 1998 adoption 
of the Lord Woolf Reforms, pursuant to which English judges 
have been endowed with far greater authority in relation to 
litigants and their lawyers, thus minimizing the adversarial 
nature of litigation.1 Similarly, scholars emphasizing a trend 
towards procedural convergence have pointed to the explosion 
of interest over the last decade or so in both continental Europe 
and Latin America in adopting some form of class action, a 
device long deemed to be uniquely suited to the procedural 
systems of the United States (Faulk, 2000, pp. 205, 228-34; 
Nagreda, 2009).
Such convergence, in turn, is often explained as an offshoot 
of modern-day globalization.  From this perspective, one of two 
causal accounts is offered.  First, convergence is depicted as a 
product of functional pressures that, because of processes of 
globalization, are now making themselves felt across the world. 
On this view, for example, democracies everywhere are under 
increased pressure to afford justice to citizenries that, especially 
with the mid-twentieth century rise of the social welfare state, 
have become increasingly accustomed to the notion that 
government is responsible for attending to their various needs. 
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Such pressure helps explains the interest shared by many legal 
systems across the globe (and clearly manifest, for example, 
in the Lord Woolf Reforms) in promoting more accurate and 
efficient court judgments (Friedman, 1985, pp. 30-34, 153-56; 
Jolowicz, 2000, pp. 85-93).
Alternatively, convergence is depicted as a product of 
influence in an interconnected global environment. On this 
theory, certain legal systems and their actors—including, 
perhaps most prominently, the United States and its lawyers—
have been able to take advantage of geopolitical imbalances 
of power in an increasingly globalized context to exercise 
disproportionate power in shaping the development of the 
world’s legal systems. Along these lines, for example, some 
have pointed to recent jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) concerning the right to a fair hearing, as 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Pursuant to this jurisprudence, longstanding aspects 
of French (and French-derived procedure) —including, the 
important advisory role traditionally played by the juge raporteur 
and avocat général— have been deemed impermissible. In the 
view of some scholars, the ECHR’s recent line of argument is 
best explained as a product of the growing influence in Europe 
of American and English lawyers and their starkly adversarial 
conception of procedural justice (Mitchel, 2005)2.
It is not my goal in this paper to dispute either of these two 
accounts of convergence, both of which are likely correct to at 
least some extent. My aim is instead to emphasize the extent to 
which both accounts rely on globalization as a driving force, 
thus suggesting that convergence is of relatively recent origin. In 
reality, however, the existence of points of convergence between 
what we think of as common law and civil law procedural 
systems long predates modern-day globalization. And this, in 
turn, is a reminder that what we now call globalization is itself 
simply the latest phase in a centuries-long trend of increased 
socio-economic, cultural, and legal interchange across territorial 
boundaries. As Reinhard Zimmerman and other advocates of the 
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harmonization of European private law have rightly emphasized, 
in the centuries before the late eighteenth-century emergence 
of the modern nation-state, medieval and early modern 
European societies were profoundly transnational. Accordingly, 
European law faculties (on both sides of the English Channel) 
taught students from throughout Europe a form of common, 
transnational law—namely, the ius commune (Schulze, 1992, 
pp. 270, 276-284; Zimmermann, 1995, pp. 82-89).  As European 
states began engaging in projects of colonization and conquest 
from the fifteenth century onward, so too they brought their 
law—including the ius commune—to much of the rest of the 
world.  From the perspective of the long durée, in other words, 
the recent, late twentieth- and early twenty-first century trend 
towards increased economic interdependence and cultural 
homogeneity that we know by the name of globalization is but 
the latest outgrowth of a much older trajectory.  And as this 
suggests, convergence in the law of civil procedure—including 
across common law and civil law systems—is nothing new.
It is beyond the scope of this brief paper to provide a 
comprehensive history of procedural convergence.  Instead, 
I focus on one particular site of convergence—namely, the 
Anglo-American tradition of equity as it emerged in the early 
nineteenth century in the newly established United States. 
Given the widespread tendency to assume that common law 
(and especially American) procedure is distinctively—indeed, 
necessarily—adversarial, the example of equity procedure is 
a particularly striking reminder that procedural convergence is 
in no way a uniquely modern phenomenon.  As this history 
teaches, the United States borrowed greatly from the inquisitorial 
tradition of the civil law and its Roman-canon heritage. 
I. ANGLO-AMERICAN EQUITY PROCEDURE AND ITS 
ROMAN-CANON ROOTS
While my interest in this paper is in American equity 
procedure, such procedure derived from English practice, and 
we must therefore begin with the English Court of Chancery, the 
birthplace of equity. Relatively little is known about the early 
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development of Chancery jurisdiction, but it is clear that the 
court had deep roots in the Roman-canon tradition. 
As its name suggests, Chancery originated as the jurisdiction 
of the chancellor, who served as keeper of the great seal, which 
was used to authenticate royal documents, including the writs 
that authorized litigants to proceed before the common law 
courts. By the late thirteenth century, many litigants seeking 
justice began directly petitioning the king, rather than the 
common-law courts—perhaps because their claims did not 
fall within the established and increasingly rigid common-
law writs. In the fourteenth century, as such petitions became 
more numerous, the king’s council started delegating them to 
individual councilors, and from such delegations there arose a 
variety of courts, including that of the chancellor—namely, the 
Chancery (Baker, 2002, p.98-99). 
Petitions thus delegated by the king’s council (and, soon 
thereafter, addressed directly to the chancellor) came to constitute 
the “English Side” of Chancery jurisdiction—thus designated 
because these petitions were drafted in the vernacular and to 
distinguish them from those of Chancery’s “Latin Side,” which 
concerned matters, such as questions relating to royal grants, 
that arose from the chancellor’s administrative work (Baker, 
2002, p.100-103). While petitions on the English Side were 
initially formulated as appeals to the chancellor’s conscience 
and the chancellor was thus relatively unrestrained by formal 
doctrine in his effort to do justice, chancery jurisprudence 
became increasingly formalized with the passage of time.  By 
the early seventeenth century, it had developed into an entirely 
separate institutional and doctrinal system of justice known as 
equity (p.105-1011; Macnair, 1999, p.30).
Until Henry VIII broke with the Catholic Church in the first 
third of the sixteenth century, many chancellors continued to 
be leading ecclesiastics, often bishops or archbishops, trained 
in the law of the Church, and not in the common law (Baker, 
2002, p. 99; 2003, p. 180). As the chancellor was the Chancery 
Court’s only judge, he was greatly in need of assistance and 
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turned for help to his clerical staff—particularly, the twelve 
clerici ad robas (p. 99, 100; 2003, p. 182)3. These clerks, dating 
back at least as far as the thirteenth century, had initially aided 
the chancellor primarily in his administrative duties (Heward, 
1990). But from the fourteenth century onward, as the English 
side of Chancery emerged and the judicial workload became 
increasingly heavy, they began to focus primarily on these 
cases. By the late fifteenth century, they came to be known as 
masters (Baker, 2002, p. 100). 
At least through the fifteenth century, masters, like the 
chancellors of this period, were largely clerics. And through the 
early seventeenth century, and then again from 1633 through the 
English Revolution of 1640, they were almost all doctors of law, 
trained in the Roman-canon law, rather than in the common law 
(Baker, 2002, p. 183; Heward, 1990, pp.7)4. Because masters 
were trained as civilians, the Chancery Court’s reference of a 
case to a master continued, as of the early seventeenth century, 
to be described as a “reference to the Doctors” (Macnair, 1999, p.32).
Although it is evident that the early Chancellors and, for a 
longer period, masters were trained in the Roman-canon law, 
it is less clear what effect this training had on the development 
of equity doctrine and procedure.  Indeed, the extent to which 
equity was influenced by the Roman-canon tradition has 
been a subject of longstanding controversy, not only among 
later historians, but also among early-modern contemporaries. 
The primary points of dispute, however, have concerned the 
substantive law of equity.5 As concerns equity procedure, my 
focus here, it is widely agreed that the parallels with the Roman-
canon tradition are quite strong (Baker, 2002, p. 106; 2003, p. 
180). But before describing this procedure in any detail, it is 
necessary briefly to examine how the system of equity and its 
personnel made its way to the “new world.”  
As of the early seventeenth century, when the first English 
colonies were created in North America, the equity system in 
England was well established.  Although equity was relatively 
slow to take hold in the new colonies,6 some type of chancery 
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court had been established in many of the thirteen colonies 
as of 1776 (Bryant, 1954, p.595, 598). But with the American 
Revolution, there reemerged a longstanding association 
between equity and tyranny that had first been forged in the 
crucible of the English Revolution. 
In seventeenth-century England, the conflict between 
parliamentarians and royalists manifested itself, in part, in an 
institutional struggle between courts of common law, on the 
one hand, and those courts associated with the Roman-canon 
tradition (namely, equity and ecclesiastical courts), on the other. 
Parliamentarians embraced the common-law courts as bastions 
of England’s ancient constitution, and thus, of its citizens’ 
immemorial, customary rights (including rights to sovereignty) 
(Pocock, 1987). They depicted the equity and ecclesiastical 
courts, in contrast, as emanating from the royal will and tending 
towards popish subservience, such that these institutions 
threatened to promote (royal and popish) tyranny (Knafla, 1977; 
Meyler, n.d).
The various equity courts of early-modern England had 
initially arisen, as was true of Chancery, when petitions directed 
to the king were delegated to individual members of the king’s 
council, who eventually came to form their own separate 
courts.  Whereas Chancery had emerged as a separate court, 
distinct from the king’s council, by the fifteenth century, the 
other conciliar courts, including Star Chamber, Requests, and 
Admiralty, did not do so until the sixteenth century—and 
thus, they, even more than Chancery, continued to be closely 
associated with, and deemed institutional embodiments of, 
the royal will. Since the monarchy in the 1630s turned to 
the Star Chamber to prosecute highly unpopular cases of 
sedition and ecclesiastical offenses, it, of all the equity courts, 
came to be particularly hated and feared.  But in the view of 
the parliamentarians, many of whom were also Puritans, the 
ecclesiastical courts also posed a great threat.  Especially 
loathsome was the Court of High Commission, which was 
established in the 1580s, as a forum in which the king, as head 
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of the Church of England, could exercise jurisdiction in criminal 
matters. As a criminal court operating largely under the king’s 
thumb and employing Roman-canon procedure, the Court of 
High Commission was widely viewed as a spiritual counterpart 
to the Star Chamber and thus was also despised (Baker, 2002, 
p. 117, 119, 131). 
Particularly after Charles I married a French Catholic, and 
rumors of a possible return to Catholicism spread, fear of royal 
tyranny came to merge with fear of popish tyranny, such that 
any judicial institution that was in any way associated with 
the Roman-canon tradition, came to be viewed as a potential 
weapon in a royalist and popish plot to dominate England 
(Hibbard, 1983). To a significant extent, this parliamentarian 
and Puritan viewpoint won the day, and in 1641, the English 
Revolutionaries dismantled the Star Chamber and other conciliar 
courts, as well as the Court of High Commission, and a few 
years later, they abolished the other ecclesiastical courts (Baker, 
2002, p. 213). While the Court of Chancery survived, it was —
and long continued to be— tarred by the conceptual link forged 
in the revolutionary era between courts drawing on the Roman-
canon tradition, on the one hand, and the perceived threat of 
tyranny, on the other. Thus, not surprisingly, when more than 
a century later, the American Revolutionaries rose up against 
what Thomas Paine described as “the remains of monarchical 
tyranny”(Paine, 2003), they reverted to the link between equity 
and tyranny forged by an earlier generation of revolutionaries 
(Friedman, 1985; Moschzisker, 1927, pp. 288-289).
This reversion was facilitated by the fact that during the 
colonial period, judges were frequently appointed by royal 
governors, such that they were generally associated with 
monarchical control (Beale, 1921). In addition, from the 
revolutionary perspective, the very structure and justification 
of courts of equity —the commitment of adjudication to a 
judge, rather than to a jury of one’s peers, and the discretion 
granted judges (at least in theory) in administering procedure 
and ordering relief— seemed to validate and encourage the 
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exercise of arbitrary power.7 And particularly troubling to many 
of the revolutionary generation was the equitable approach to 
gathering witness testimony. As I will describe at greater length 
shortly, testimony in equity was traditionally taken outside the 
presence of the parties by an examining officer appointed by 
the court on the basis of written interrogatories prepared by 
the parties, and the recorded narrative of such testimony was 
then kept secret until all witnesses had been examined.  In 
the eyes of many early Americans, such practices smacked of 
the inquisition itself, thus constituting a kind of bastion of the 
reactionary, “Old World” right in the heart of the United States’ 
grand, revolutionary experiment. 
Distrust of equity therefore quickly manifested itself in a 
frontal attack on its traditional methods for gathering witness 
testimony. In Section 30 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 ch. 20, 1 
Stat. 73, 88, § 30, the U.S. Congress declared that federal courts 
must adopt the common-law method of presenting testimony 
orally in the courtroom, thereby eschewing the equitable 
tradition of testimony gathered and kept in secret on the basis 
of pre-prepared, written interrogatories: “[T]he mode of proof 
by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court 
shall be the same in all the courts of the United States, as well 
in the trial of causes in equity and of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction as of actions at common law” (1789, ch. 20, § 30).
With the gradual subsiding of revolutionary fervor in the 
years after 1776, there occurred a quiet resurgence of traditional 
equitable practice. The reasons for this resurgence are quite 
complex and are yet to be fully explained. But for present 
purposes, the key point is that the early nineteenth century 
witnessed a renewed interest in equity procedure. Accordingly, 
on April 29, 1802, Congress enacted legislation providing that, 
in those states where courts permitted practitioners to rely on 
testimony taken in the traditional, equitable way—namely, 
through out-of-court, ex parte examination—federal courts 
sitting in equity could do the same, despite Section 30 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789: “[I]n all suits in equity, it shall be in 
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the discretion of the court, upon the request of either party, 
to order the testimony of the witnesses therein to be taken by 
deposition.”8 This return to the equitable tradition of written, 
ex parte testimony was enshrined in Rules 25 and 28 of the 
first edition of the Federal Rules of Equity,9 issued by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in February 1822.10 These Rules provided that 
the regular, established mode for procuring witness testimony in 
equity cases was before court-appointed officers designated to 
take and record the testimony outside the courtroom. 
As of the early nineteenth century, Congress’ effort in 1789 
to reject equity’s longstanding tradition of gathering witness 
testimony in writing, outside the courtroom had failed, and 
federal courts rapidly returned to an equity tradition inherited 
from England and dating back in North America to the early 
seventeenth century.  Indeed, the link between the equity 
system established in the federal courts and its English ancestor 
was enshrined in Rule 33 of the Federal Equity Rules of 1822, 
which specified that “[i]n all cases where the rules prescribed by 
this court, or by the Circuit Court, do not apply, the practice of 
the Circuit Courts shall be regulated by the practice of the High 
Court of Chancery of England.” Likewise, the traditional English 
model of equity was reinforced through the major nineteenth-
century American treatises on equity practice, which were, in 
fact, revised editions of the leading English treatises, updated 
to include discussions of American practice and citations to 
American case law.11 And key American states, including the 
highly influential state of New York under the leadership of 
Chancellor James Kent, made a concerted effort to adhere to 
the traditional English model of equity procedure (Kessler, 2011).
What then was the equitable procedure that in broad outline 
was embraced by early nineteenth-century American equity 
courts, including the federal courts sitting in equity? It was in 
all major respects—including, most importantly, pleading and 
the taking of testimony—much more similar to the procedure of 
the civil law systems of contemporary continental Europe and 
Latin America than to that of the common law. As concerns 
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pleading, the suit commenced when the plaintiff filed a bill of 
complaint, in which he provided a detailed narrative account of 
his various legal claims and the facts supporting them. In sharp 
contrast to common law pleading, in other words, the plaintiff 
in equity was in no way required to narrow his dispute to a 
single legal claim, as narrowly defined by the available forms 
of action (Subrin, 1987, pp. 909,915-17). In response to the bill 
of complaint, the defendant was required to appear and file 
an answer under oath, in which he, like the plaintiff, was free 
to raise any and all claims, defenses, and supporting facts.12 
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a “replication,” or reply, and the 
case was deemed “at issue,” such that the taking of testimony 
could begin (Macnair, 1999, p. 53; Mitford & Tyler, 1978, pp. 
67-69, 458). 
As concerns the taking of testimony, the centerpiece of the 
adversarial common-law trial, equity procedure employed 
a radically different methodology. Under the common law, 
testimony was taken orally by the parties’ lawyers in the public 
courtroom, in the presence not only of the judge, but also 
the opposing litigant, the jury, and the audience as a whole. 
Such publicity was thought to be essential for oral, adversarial 
cross-examination, and thus for promoting witness veracity 
and detecting falsehood. The logic of cross-examination was 
that witnesses who testified in public—before the parties 
and members of their community sitting as jurors and in the 
audience—would feel great pressure to speak truthfully.  And 
should they lie, they would experience much discomfort and 
anxiety, signs of which they would necessarily exhibit in their 
demeanor, which would, in turn, be observed by the fact-
finding jury. 
In sharp contrast to this publicity-oriented approach, equity 
procedure developed a commitment to secrecy as the best 
possible method for ensuring truthful testimony and ferreting 
out falsehoods. But to understand how this now unfamiliar 
logic of secrecy worked, it is necessary to begin by describing 
at some length equity’s procedural mechanisms for the taking of 
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testimony. Once these are clearly established, it will be possible 
to show how, as in the Roman-canon tradition, these were 
understood as truth-promoting devices.
Pursuant to the traditions of equity, a party seeking witness 
testimony did not summon his witness to the public courtroom 
to be questioned orally but instead drafted a set of written 
interrogatories to be administered by the court. Once a party 
filed interrogatories with the court, the latter appointed an 
officer whose responsibility it was to present the interrogatories 
to the witness. The officer then recorded the testimony—in 
the form of a narrative, rather than as a verbatim transcript of 
questions asked and answered—and transmitted this record 
back to the court (Macnair, 1999, pp. 166.-168; Mitford & Tyler, 
1878, p.458). While the mode of taking witness testimony 
varied somewhat between states, and between the different 
federal courts (Daniell, 1894, p.1168 n.3), the procedure and 
personnel were largely identical in function, if not in name, 
to that employed in the English Court of Chancery. Both the 
English Court of Chancery and American courts of equity 
typically drew a distinction between testimony taken locally, 
when the witness resided in the vicinity of the court, and that 
taken when the witness lived at some distance. Typically, when 
the witness resided in the vicinity of the court, permanent court 
officials known as examiners (or sometimes in the United States, 
standing commissioners) were responsible for administering 
interrogatories (Mitford & Tyler, 1878, pp.429-439). If the 
witnesses resided further afield, the court appointed private 
individuals, designated “commissioners,” to take the testimony 
on a case-by-case basis—presumably because it was inefficient 
to require the busy examiners to travel to the witnesses.13 
Once all testimony and documentary evidence was gathered, 
the parties presented it at a hearing, after which the judge 
would either enter a final decree, resolving the dispute, or an 
interlocutory decree, ordering further proceedings. Such further 
proceedings were generally directed towards the determination 
of disputed questions of fact and often took the form of a 
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reference to a master (Mitford & Tyler, 1878, p. 469), whose fees 
were to be paid by the litigants.14 Masters were asked to report 
on a nearly infinite variety of questions. As explained by Murray 
Hoffman, a master in the early nineteenth-century New York 
Court of Chancery: “In general there is no question of law or 
equity, no disputed fact, which a master may not have occasion 
to decide, or respecting which he may not be called upon to 
report his opinion to the court.”15 Likewise, Edmund Robert 
Daniell’s Pleading and Practice of the High Court of Chancery, 
a leading nineteenth-century treatise on equity practice, used 
in both England and the United States, advised readers that “[t]
he cases in which the Master may be directed to make inquiries 
into facts are so numerous and various in their nature, that it is 
impossible to point out the rules by which each inquiry is to be 
pursued in the Master’s office” (Daniell, 1894, p. 1215).
Whatever the nature of the inquiry that the master was 
delegated to undertake—and settling an account between 
the litigants was probably the most common—the decree 
appointing the master typically provided him authority to 
determine whatever fact-finding was required in the case 
and to direct the necessary discovery, including ordering the 
parties and/or witnesses to produce documents and to submit 
to examination under oath (Bennet, 1834; Hoffman, 1824, 
pp. 9-36).  Thus, unlike what the common-law jury had long 
since become, the master was not simply a passive audience 
for whatever evidence the parties chose to present, but instead 
played an active, inquisitorial role in determining what evidence 
should be heard and which questions asked.16 
As for the mode of taking testimony, if the parties or witnesses 
whom the master sought to examine lived at some distance 
from the court, the master would resort to the standard method 
of appointing a commission. But if the witness resided in the 
vicinity of the court, the master himself would serve the function 
of the examiner or standing commissioner, administering written 
interrogatories prepared by the parties (and, when he deemed 
necessary, by himself as well), recording a narrative of the 
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testimony, and then transmitting it back to the court (Hoffman, 
1824, pp.47-58). Once the master collected all the evidence he 
considered necessary, he wrote a report to the court, presenting 
his findings as directed in the order of reference. 
II. THE LOGIC OF SECRECY
The equity tradition reminds us that, contrary to the 
widespread assumption today, inquisitorial modes of 
adjudication are not entirely alien to the legal culture of the 
United States. This is not, of course to suggest, that the United 
States ever adopted a fully inquisitorial mode of procedure—
but the same could be said of the civil procedure administered 
by civil law systems.  In other words, the civil procedure of 
both equity and the civil law retained important accusatorial 
elements—including, not least, the fact that proceedings were 
always initiated by the plaintiffs themselves, rather than by court 
officials.17 That said, American equity did embrace key features 
of inquisitorial procedure, including perhaps most importantly, 
its secrecy-oriented approach to witness testimony. 
In the logic of equity, secrecy was key to promoting truthful 
testimony. This was the logic of the Roman-canon law, whose 
expositors throughout the medieval and early-modern periods 
regularly justified the tradition of secret examination by citing 
the biblical story of Susanna and the Elders from the Book of 
Daniel. As explained by the legal historian R.H. Helmholz:
The Book of Daniel recounts that when Susanna resisted 
the advances of the elders, they resolved to revenge 
themselves by accusing her of adultery with an imaginary 
young man.  After Susanna had been condemned to 
death in an open trial, Daniel intervened. He questioned 
the two elders separately about the supposed crime. One 
of them placed her action under a yew tree; the other 
under a clove tree. Thus was their perjury revealed and 
the life of an innocent woman saved.  Proceduralists saw 
in this story clear support for their system of ... canonical 
procedure. (1995, pp. 1557, 1573-1574)
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As in the Roman-canon law tradition, equity procedure was 
premised on the belief that, to the extent that witnesses were 
examined in private, outside the presence of either party, this 
decreased the likelihood of perjury or error. Taking testimony 
in secret reduced any temptation witnesses might have (on 
their own, or under party pressure) to alter their testimony for 
the purpose of making it consistent with that of others—and 
without any need for the court to order sequestration in the 
particular case. And if it was determined that a witness had 
made a false statement in response to an interrogatory, the 
written, secretive mode of taking the testimony was thought to 
indicate—in a way that a similarly false statement in response 
to oral cross-examination would not—that the witness’s entire 
testimony should be disregarded as likely perjurious. As one 
treatise-writer explained, in common-law “tribunals the witness 
is not only examined orally, but is subjected to a severe and 
rapid cross-examination, without sufficient time for reflection or 
for deliberate answers, and hence may often misrepresent facts, 
from infirmity of recollection or mistake”(Henderson, 1904, p. 363). 
In contrast, according to the course of chancery, the 
testimony of the witness is taken upon interrogatories in 
writing, deliberately propounded to him by the examiner, 
no other person being present; and where ample time 
is allowed for calm recollection, and any mistakes in 
his first answers may be corrected at the close of the 
examination, when the whole is distinctly read over him; 
there is ground to presume that a false statement of fact is 
the result either of bad design or of gross ignorance of the 
truth, and culpable recklessness of assertion; in either of 
which cases all confidence in his testimony must be lost, 
or at least essentially impaired.(Henderson, 1904, p. 364) 
To maintain the secrecy deemed necessary to avoid error and 
fraud and thereby arrive at the truth, equity courts developed 
an interlocking set of procedures all focused on this goal. First, 
witness testimony, as recorded by an examiner or commissioner 
prior to referring the case to a master, was not to be revealed until 
the court ordered its publication. Such an order of publication 
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would be entered only after all witnesses had been examined. 
And no further examinations were permitted—absent some 
showing of extraordinary circumstances—once publication 
had occurred. In this way, each witness would be required to 
testify entirely from memory (Bennet,1834, p. 14-14; Hoffman, 
1824, p.40-47; Macnair, 1999, p.166-167). Indeed, one of the 
main reasons why equity traditionally relied on court-appointed 
officers to take testimony, rather than permitting the parties to 
do so themselves, was to guarantee its secrecy until publication. 
If the parties or their counsel were allowed to undertake the 
examination, they would gain knowledge that might influence 
their litigation strategy, including the witnesses they chose to 
call and the interrogatories they put to them. Court-appointed 
officers, in contrast, lacked any personal connection with the 
parties and the litigation and thus were thought to have no 
incentive to promote the interests of either side. As for the 
questions posed by these court-appointed officers, it was the 
parties themselves, who drafted written interrogatories, which 
they filed with the Court for use by the officer. To ensure that 
the testimony thus taken did indeed remain perfectly secret 
until the court ordered its publication, stringent requirements 
existed regarding how narratives recorded in the field were to 
be sealed and returned to the court.18 
Within this framework, masters were legitimated and 
constrained by these fundamental structuring principles of 
secrecy. While they possessed the inquisitorial authority to 
determine what evidence, including which witnesses, they 
required to be brought before them,19 this authority was far 
from limitless because masters had to abide by equity’s well-
established rules prohibiting repeat testimony—rules that limited 
which witnesses masters could call, as well as the questions they 
could pose on behalf of the parties (or on their own initiative). 
The master who opted to take testimony himself was prohibited, 
like an examiner or commissioner, from questioning a witness 
who had been previously examined regarding the same facts. 
And in order to examine this witness concerning new facts, or to 
examine a new witness concerning facts about which another 
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had already testified, the master was required to seek special 
court authorization (Hoffman, 1824, pp. 40-47). Likewise, in 
drawing on the evidence necessary to write his report, the master 
relied, in part, on examinations undertaken prior to the order of 
reference, which had themselves been done in secret—namely, 
by examiners or commissioners in private, outside the presence 
of the parties and kept under wraps until all examinations were 
completed and the court ordered publication. 
A classic account of these procedures designed to promote 
(pre-publication) secrecy, as well as of the rationale behind 
them, appears in the judicial opinions of James Kent, author of 
the famous Commentaries on American Law and Chancellor 
of the New York Court of Chancery. Kent’s influence was such 
that his opinions regarding equity practice were cited widely 
in both state and federal courts and played a leading role in 
the shaping of equity practice throughout the nation. As Kent 
explained in the very influential case of Remsen v. Remsen,20 
the reason why “examinations in chief are not permitted, after 
publication” is that “there is very great danger of abuse from 
public examinations, by which parties are enabled to detect the 
weak parts of the adversary’s case, or of their own, and to hunt 
up or fabricate testimony to meet the pressure or exigency of the 
inquiry.” Accordingly, once the court ordered the publication of 
all testimony, further testimony before the master was not to 
be allowed, unless directed by the court, and then only as to 
issues regarding which the witness had not previously testified: 
“It is also upon the same grounds, that a witness, who has been 
examined in chief before the hearing, cannot be re-examined 
before the master, without an order, and, then, not to any matter 
to which he had before been examined; and that a witness, 
once examined, before the master, cannot be re-examined 
without an order” (Remsen v. Remsen, 2 Johns. Ch. 495. N.Y. 
Ch. 1817).
Federal case law from the same period fully embraced these 
principles of secrecy. Thus, for example, in Gass v. Stinson,21 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Story—the author of two highly 
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influential treatises on equity (Story, 1839; 1840) —held that 
once testimony had been made public, a party seeking to 
undertake further examinations for the purpose of challenging 
the witness’s competency or credibility was required to obtain 
the court’s permission. A motion to take additional testimony 
for the purpose of challenging witness competency would be 
granted only “if the incompetency of the witness was [not] 
known before the commission to take his deposition was issued; 
for an interrogatory might then have been put to him, directly 
on the point” (10 F., 1837, Cas.71). In contrast, where the motion 
was to take additional testimony for the purpose of challenging 
witness credibility, this was almost always permitted. 
Citing the authority of Lord Hardwicke, Chancellor of 
England in the mid-eighteenth century, Justice Story explained 
that one of the reasons why courts more readily grant post-
publication motions to take testimony challenging witness 
credibility, as opposed to witness competency, is that “matters 
examined to in such cases are not material to the merits of the 
cause, but only relative to the character of the witnesses”. In 
permitting such examinations as to credibility, however, courts 
must be careful to ensure that “the interrogatories are confined 
to general interrogatories as to credit, or to such particular 
facts only, as are not material to what is already in issue in the 
cause” (Gass v. Stinson, 10 F., 1837, Cas.71). Only in this way 
can the court “prevent the party under color of an examination 
to credit, from procuring testimony to overcome the testimony 
already taken in the cause, and published, in violation of the 
fundamental principle of the court, which does not allow any 
new evidence of the facts in issue after publication” (10 F., 1837, 
Cas.71). In sum, Justice Story reaffirmed the longstanding and 
fundamental tenet of equity jurisprudence that the veracity 
of witness testimony was to be ensured by maintaining (pre-
publication) secrecy. 
This insistence on the virtues of secrecy was alien to the 
common law. As Chancellor Kent, Justice Story, and their 
contemporaries were well aware, this was the logic of Susanna 
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and the Elders—the logic, in other words, of the Roman-canon 
tradition.
III. A Concluding Note: The Limits of Our Comparative 
Categories and the Dialogic Virtue of Convergence
Because the United States is a common law country, we 
assume that its procedural system is necessarily adversarial, but 
instead, as I have argued in this paper, it has at key moments 
embraced many features of the inquisitorial procedure that we 
associate with the civil law tradition. The fact that American 
equity procedure appropriated some of the procedural devices 
and logic of the Roman-canon law serves as an important 
reminder that legal systems that we associate with the common 
law tradition have long borrowed from those of the civil law 
and vice versa.
That there are limits to the accuracy of the categories of 
common law and civil does not mean that they are without 
utility. To the contrary, recognized for what they are—as 
ideal types, rather than realistic depictions—these categories 
are useful as heuristic devices.  In particular, they can help 
to identify in broad brush some of the core characteristics or 
tendencies of the legal systems associated with each tradition. 
Thus, while Anglo-American procedure does have its own 
history of inquisitorial practices, these were less central to the 
development of the Anglo-American common law than to the 
development of the European civil law. And one key reason for 
this goes, in turn, to another distinguishing set of tendencies 
that the categories of common law and civil law can help us 
to recognize—namely, the fact that, over the long run, civil 
law systems have exhibited a much greater willingness to 
professionalize government office (including the judiciary) than 
have common law systems. 
In contrast to continental legal systems, English (and later 
American) justice as a whole was marked by a characteristically 
Anglo-American (or common law) tendency not to develop a 
large, state-controlled and -funded bureaucracy. As a result, 
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English and American equity courts were both understaffed. 
Indeed, in both countries, the Chancery was a one-judge 
court. Moreover, in England, between 1300 and 1800, there 
were rarely more than fifteen judges in Chancery and the 
common-law courts combined (Dawson, 1960, pp-70-72). The 
chancellor could, of course, rely on masters to provide key 
help in the fact-gathering process, and indeed, the master’s 
judicial role was created precisely because a single judge 
could not possibly manage the entire caseload. But there 
were relatively few masters.22 And when witnesses were to be 
examined at some remove from the court, Chancery had to 
rely on lay commissioners. In contrast, to take the example of 
a neighboring civil law country, France by the early eighteenth 
century had more than 5,000 royal judges—a difference that 
remains significant, even when France’s larger population is 
taken into account. Moreover, French judges had numerous 
full-time assistants to whom they could turn to engage in the 
difficult and time-consuming work of fact-finding.23 
Given equity’s commitment to a form of procedure 
that entailed substantial inquisitorial elements, and thus 
its ultimate dependence on judicial officers to undertake 
many core functions, this common-law tendency to eschew 
bureaucratization proved quite fateful. There was, in short, a 
core tension between the court’s mode of procedure and its 
limited, ad hoc staffing.24 And as John Dawson has powerfully 
argued, this tension would contribute to the ultimate demise 
of equity as a distinctive substantive and procedural tradition 
(Dawson, 1960, pp. 170-172).
In addition to reminding us of the limits of our standard 
comparative categories of analysis, the example of equity 
procedure teaches the core lesson that, while there is now much 
talk about a new procedural convergence, such convergence 
is in fact far from new. In this respect, the example of equity 
procedure is particularly telling because it strikes at the heart 
of one of the most deep-rooted and widely shared conceptions 
about American legal culture—namely, that it is exclusively and 
distinctively adversarial. 
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That said, the fact that forms of borrowing and thus 
convergence have long been with us does not mean that we 
are moving inexorably towards total harmonization, nor should 
it. In contrast to those who are now arguing, for example, for 
the creation of a single body of European private law, I—like I 
suspect most lawyers trained within the United States—have an 
abiding respect for the virtues of difference.  There are, in short, 
multiple ways to approach the same procedural goal—and of 
course, multiple goals as well to which any given procedural 
system might aspire.  And while procedural convergence is, as 
I have been arguing, the norm, so too is the coexistence of 
important pressures towards divergence. 
From my perspective therefore, the recognition that 
procedural convergence is old hat is significant not because it 
promises an ultimate harmonization of the law, but because it 
serves as a valuable reminder of shared commonalities, which 
can in turn, help to encourage mutual respect and understanding. 
Often in short supply, such respect and understanding have 
seemed at times to be particularly lacking in current debates 
stemming from such contentious procedural practices as, for 
example, the American law of discovery and punitive damages. 
My own hope is that an awareness of convergence, both past 
and present, might in the future provide a much-needed, 
common point of entry for more productive discussion and 
dialogue across the world’s procedural systems.
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Notes
1 Included within this authority, for example, is the power to direct that 
only one expert be used.  Although the parties retain the formal power of  
appointment, this new approach avoids the adversarial battle of  experts and 
thereby approximates the practice in most civil law systems, where the expert 
is expected to produce a neutral, objective report (Jolowicz, 2000, pp. 57-58, 
239-42; Stürner, 2000). 
2 Describing the widely held French view that “the link between the European 
decisions (and Europe generally), American judicial imperialism, and the 
death of  French civil-law particularism could hardly be more apparent.”  
3 These twelve were called clerici ad robas because they received liveries of  
robes.
4 During the first three decades of  the seventeenth century, most masters were 
common lawyers, but in 1633, the Privy Council declared that at least eight 
of  the eleven masters must be civilians.  Thereafter, and until the English 
Revolution, only civilians were named masters (Macnair, 1999, p. 32).  Indeed, 
according to one anonymous master, writing in the late sixteenth or early 
seventeenth century, masters “were [once] called clerici, because they were 
auntientlie all of  them cleorrgie men” (Hargrave, 1787; Heward, 1990, p.1).
5 As of  the late fourteenth century, masters sometimes joined the chancellor 
on the bench when he tried matters of  maritime, martial and ecclesiastical 
law, all of  which drew heavily on the Roman-canon tradition (Heward, 1990, 
pp. 9, 11).  And according to an account by an anonymous master writing 
at some point between 1596 and 1603, masters through the mid-sixteenth 
century regularly attended sessions of  the House of  Lords so that they could 
provide advice regarding matters of  civil and canon law: “The reason of  ther 
attendance there I take to be ... [that the Lords] may ... bee informed by the 
masters of  the chauncery (of  which the greattest number have alwaies bene 
chosen men, skillful in the civill and canon lawes) in lawes that they shall 
make touchinge foraine matters, whowe the same shall accorde with equitie, 
jus gentium, and the lawes of  other nations”(Hargrave, 1787, p.309). It remains 
far from clear, however, that the civil law had much direct influence on the 
development of  the substantive law of  equity or on the development of  
English law more generally (Baker, 2003, pp. 180-81).
6 This is likely because equity focused on more complex legal arrangements 
than were usually needed in the relatively undeveloped colonial societies, and 
because, as described below, for many colonial transplants, there remained 
lingering associations between equity and tyrannical rule (Bryant, 1954, 
p.595).
7 As the American revolutionary generation was so influenced by French 
Enlightenment thought, it also seems probable that its distaste for equity 
stemmed in part from contemporary French reformers’ complaints about the 
arbitrary nature of  judicial decision-making.  For an overview of  the French 
experience, see Isser Wolloch, I. (1994). The New Regime: Transformations of  
the French Civic Order, 1789-1820s (pp.  297-320). New York: Norton.
 72 |||
8 An Act to Amend the Judicial System of  the United States, 1802, ch. 31, 2 
Stat. 156, 166, § 25. This 1802 statute specified that federal courts choosing to 
rely on depositions were to ensure that these were “taken in conformity to the 
regulations prescribed by law for the courts of  the highest original jurisdiction 
in equity ... in that state in which the court of  the United States may be holden.” 
Accordingly, the statute’s authorization to rely on depositions did not “extend 
to the circuit courts which may be holden in those states, in which testimony 
in chancery is not taken by deposition.” Given the Jeffersonian commitment to 
state, as opposed to federal power, this effort to recognize the continuing force 
of  equitable tradition had the added virtue of  bringing federal equity practice 
in line with that of  the states.  It should also be emphasized that, as used in 
the equity tradition (and thus in Congress’ statute of  April 29, 1802), the 
term “deposition” was synonymous with “examination” and must therefore 
not be confused with the procedural device by this name currently employed 
in the United States (Fed. R. Civ. P. 30; Fed. R. Civ. P. 32). In the modern-day 
deposition, testimony is taken by the parties themselves in oral, adversarial 
fashion.  Its primary purpose (unless the deponent proves unavailable at the 
time of  trial) is not to bring witness testimony before the court—a function 
served, instead, by in-court trial testimony—but rather to assist the parties in 
the discovery process, whereby often inadmissible testimony is gathered.  In 
contrast, in the equity tradition, the term “deposition” referred to testimony 
taken outside the parties’ presence by a court-appointed officer, based on 
written interrogatories.  And this ex parte procedure was the primary vehicle 
for bringing witness testimony before the court.  
9 Rule 25 provided that “[t]estimony may be taken according to the acts of  
Congress, or under a commission,” Fed. R. Eq. 25 (1822), and Rule 28 that 
“[w]itnesses who live within the district may, upon due notice of  the opposite 
party, be summoned to appear before the commissioners appointed to take 
testimony, or before a master or examiner appointed in any cause ...,” Fed. R. 
Eq. 28 (1822).
10 Congress first authorized the Federal Rules of  Equity in an Act of  May 8, 
1792, which permitted “such regulations as the supreme court of  the United 
States shall think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any circuit 
or district court concerning” the “forms of  writs, executions and other 
processes.”  An Act for Regulating Processes in the Courts of  the United 
States, and Providing Compensations for the Officers of  the Said Courts, and 
for Jurors and Witnesses, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275, 276, § 2.
11 See, for example, Mitford, J. & Tyler, S. (1878). Mitford’s and Tyler’s Pleadings 
and Practice in Equity. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co and Daniell, E. (1894). 
Pleading and Practice of  the High Court of  Chancery (6.th ed., p.1168 n. 3, 1187). 
Boston:  Little, Brown & Co., which were originally English treatises and 
were then modified to accommodate American practice. Both treatises were 
reissued in several editions.
12 That the defendant was required to answer under oath distinguished equity 
from law (where parties were disqualified from serving as witnesses) and was 
widely viewed as one of  equity’s great virtues (Mitford & Tyler, 1878, pp. 63-
66; Macnair, 1999, p. 58; Millar, 1952, pp.206-207).
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13 Until the late sixteenth century, English chancery generally designated 
local notables, including priests (usually an abbot or bishop), to serve as 
commissioners. Thereafter, however, the court began to rely on the parties 
themselves to choose the commissioners (Daniell, 1894, p.1197; Macnair, 
1999, pp. 173-74).
14 “‘The compensation to be allowed to every master in chancery for his services 
in any particular case, shall be fixed by the circuit court, in its discretion, 
having regard to all the circumstance thereof, and the compensation shall 
be charged upon and borne by such parties in the cause as the Court shall 
direct’” (The New Federal Equity Rules 129-1932. (8.th ed. 1933) [discussing 
and collecting cases regarding the provision in Fed. R. Eq. 82 (1842)]; Parkes, 
1828, pp. 303-17, 449-51 [describing the English practice]).
15 Hoffman’s account of  New York chancery practice is relevant to federal 
practice for a number of  reasons, not least of  which is that federal courts in 
New York relied on masters from the New York Court of  Chancery through 
the first third of  the nineteenth century (Van Hook v. Pendleton, 28 F. Cas. 
998, 1000 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 16,852). It was only when the United States 
Circuit Court for the Southern District of  New York issued its own local rules 
on October 27, 1828 that the court established its own set of  federal masters. 
16 “Interrogatories may be framed by the master”( Hoffman, 1824, p.22). See also, 
Fed. R. Eq. 77 (1842) “The master ... shall have authority ... to direct the mode 
in which the matters requiring evidence shall be provided before him; and 
generally to do all other acts and direct all other proceedings in the matters 
before him which he may deem necessary and proper ....”.
17 Another important accusatorial element was the fact that the parties 
themselves, rather than court officials, were responsible for drafting 
interrogatories (though not for administering them to witnesses).  In this 
respect as well, equity was much like the systems of  civil procedure that 
developed in continental Europe.  In Old Regime France, for example, the 
parties identified the witnesses and submitted articles for their examination to 
court-appointed officers (Engelmann & Millar, 1927). One suspects that this 
deviation from the pure inquisitorial model followed, at least in part, from the 
fact that the court-appointed officers had no knowledge of  the case.
18  See, for example, Eiffert v. Craps, 44 F. 164 (D.S.C. 1890), where the defendant 
moved to strike testimony taken by the plaintiff  on the ground that the 
commission charged with taking the testimony had failed to transmit it back 
to the court in a manner ensuring that it would be seen by no one else prior 
to publication.  In particular, the defendant complained that when the package 
with the testimony arrived at the courthouse, the clerk discovered that the 
envelope was open, “presenting the appearance of  having been worn in the 
mail, the opposite corner of  the envelope presenting the same appearance.” 
The court denied defendant’s motion to strike the testimony because it 
concluded that there was no indication that the rule of  secrecy had been 
broken. In the process, however, it acknowledged the well-established principle 
of  equity jurisprudence that testimony taken on commission was to be kept 
absolutely secret until publication: “This commission was issued under the 
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authority of  Eq. Rule 67, and is in accordance with the well-established rule 
of  the court of  chancery. The commissioners did their duty in all respects as 
to the certification and mailing of  the package.  There is no reason to suspect 
that the contents of  the package were seen by any one.  I am satisfied that the 
abrasion of  the envelope occurred in the transmission in mailbags.” 
19 Rule 77 of  the Federal Equity Rules of  1842 confirmed the master’s long-
standing equitable authority “to direct the mode in which the matters 
requiring evidence shall be proved before him; and generally to do all other 
acts, and direct all other inquiries and proceedings in the matters before him, 
which he may deem necessary and proper to the justice and merits thereof  
and the rights of  the parties”.
20 2 Johns. Ch. 495 (N.Y. Ch. 1817). Remsen was cited as authority regarding 
equity practice as far afield as Illinois and as late as 1904 \. (Lumbard v. 
Holdiman, 115 Ill. App. 458 (1904).
21 Gass v. Stinson, 10 F. Cas. 70 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 5261).
22  There appear to have been only twelve masters (Baker, 2002, p.100; Heward, 
1990, pp. 1–2, 46). According to Baker, these masters, however, were themselves 
assisted by various kinds of  clerks, about whom even less is known (2002, p. 
100; 2003, pp. 182–86).
23 Thus, for example, the primary royal trial court of  general jurisdiction in 
Old Regime Paris—the Châtelet—had at its disposal an entire company 
of  commissioners (commissaries-enquêteurs-examineurs) to take witnesses 
testimony.  By the late seventeenth-century, the number of  such commissioners 
available to this one court alone was 48 (William, 1979, p. 119). In addition, 
Old Regime French courts could call on groups of  sworn excerpts (experts 
jurés), haling from the officially established and regulated guild system, to 
provide expert testimony (Engelmann Millar, 1927, pp. 719; Glasson & 
Tissier, 1925, p.855; Taylor, 1996, 181- 190).
24 Dawson argues that because Chancery “distributed to laymen all the functions 
that it could,” it cannot properly be categorized as inquisitorial. But setting 
aside questions of  terminology, it is clear that Chancery procedure bore a 
striking resemblance to that employed in continental courts, though there 
were some notable differences—most importantly, Chancery’s failure to 
develop a large professional staff.  And as Dawson asserts, in this respect, 
“[Chancery] followed the pattern of  government that had been established in 
England centuries before” (1960, p.172). 
